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DAVID LETSON*

Point/Nonpoint Source
Pollution Reduction Trading:
An Interpretive Survey
ABSTRACT
Nonpoint source water pollution controls may be necessary if the
objectives of federal water pollution control legislation are to be
met. Control of nonpoint sources is more likely to be cost effective
if imposed in a decentralizedmanner. One option for expanding the
regulatory scope to include nonpoint sources is to allow trading of
discharge reductions between point and nonpoint sources. A body
of research and experience suggests a capabilityfor this policy alternative to lower control costs, but we know less about important
issues such as monitoring costs, market power, distributive effects,
incentivesfor innovation, and nonconservativepollutants.

INTRODUCTION

Nonpoint source water pollution controls may be necessary if the objectives of federal water pollution control legislation are to be met.'

Control of point source discharges since 1972 has yielded some improvements in the nation's water quality. Problems with conventional pollutants
such as bacteria and oxygen-demanding waste have lessened. 2 Unfortunately, the quality of the nation's surface waters has not improved commensurately with these point source reductions.3 States continue to report
to the Environmental Protection Agency that significant portions of wa-

terways remain unfit for designated uses. Nonpoint source contributions
*The author is a resource economist with the Resources and Technology Division, Economic
Research Service, United States Department of Agriculture. The views expressed are the author's
and do not reflect official positions of the United States Department of Agriculture. The author would
like to thank Steve Crutchield, Bob Kellogg, and Jim Tobey for helpful comments on earlier drafts
of this paper. Discussions with Esther Bartfeld, Barbara Hall, Bill Hyde, and Arun Malik were
especially helpful. The usual disclaimer applies.
I. Exactly how nonpoint source controls would be imposed and who would pay for them remain
contentious issues; however, this realization itself is hardly new. See, e.g., United States Comptroller
General, National Water Quality Goals Cannot Be Attained without Attention to Pollution from
Diffused or "Nonpoint" Sources, Rep. CED-78-6 (1977).
2. United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Office of Water, National Water Quality
Inventory: 1988 Report to Congress EPA 440-4-90-003 (1990).
3. R. Smith, R. Alexander & M. Wolman, Water Quality Trends in the Nation's Rivers, 235 Sci.
1607 (1987).
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remain and have increased as a share of the problem. Impairments such
as sedimentation, nutrient enrichment, runoff from farmlands, and toxic
contamination of fish tissue and sediments have become more evident."
Nonpoint sources have grown as a share of the water quality problem
because they are harder to identify and control than point sources. Nonpoint source contributions depend upon localized features such as land
uses, climate, and geology. Control of nonpoint sources is more likely
to be cost effective if imposed in a way that allows for their site-specific

nature. One way of dealing with these institutional problems would be
to allow point sources to sponsor implementation of nonpoint source
controls rather than install further controls of their own.' Point source
operators may be better situated to identify and manage localized water

quality problems than distant regulators can be, and point/nonpoint trading
perhaps would give them incentive to do so. Dillon and Cherry Creek

Reservoirs in Colorado have programs of this type, and another for the
Tar-Pamlico River basin in North Carolina has recently appeared. 6 This
4. EPA, supra note 2.
5. Some statutory authority exists that allows states to pursue market-based approaches to nonpoint
source pollution problems. Section 319(h)(5) of the 1987 amendments to the Clean Water Act (33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1987)) gives EPA the authority to direct grants for "innovative and alternative
approaches for the control of nonpoint sources of pollution." Congress is currently revising the
Clean Water Act and is considering adding language that would explicitly allow, promote, or require
states to consider this type of policy. The objective of including such language would be to help
overcome real and perceived institutional barriers for adoption. See, E. Bartfeld, Point/Nonpoint
Source Trading: Looking Beyond Potential Cost Savings, master's thesis School of Natural Resources, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor (April 1992).
6. Point/nonpoint source trading programs are in their formative stages and as yet have not
produced economically motivated trading. The Tar-Pamlico program began in December 1989 and
has not yet produced any trading. Two reasons can be cited. First, the lack of a nutrient model for
the basin means that the state and dischargers do not have accurate information about the basin's
water quality dynamics. Second, the basin's point sources are likely to pursue inexpensive internal
modifications to achieve mandated reductions rather than trade. Apogee Research for EPA, Incentive
analysis for CWA Reauthorization: Point/Nonpoint Source Trading for Nutrient Discharge Reductions
(April 1992) (unpublished report on file with EPA's Office of Water. Washington, D.C.); Telephone
Interview with G. Anderson, economist, North Carolina Environmental Defense Fund (Apr. 10,
1991). At Dillon Reservoir, improved operating efficiency of existing tertiary treatment technology
has greatly reduced point source discharges and the need for phosphorus credits. One point/nonpoint
trade has occurred, but not as a result of the trading incentive. The Breckenridge Sanitation District
extended a sewer line to a subdivision whose septic systems were failing. The Dillon program does
operate as a framework for offsetting new nonpoint sources of phosphorus with reductions, however.
Two other nonpoint source control projects have been built and are being monitored for their removal
capabilities; credits from them may be used by treatment plants or to offset new nonpoint source
loads. The first is a stormwater drainage/settling system built by the community of Frisco in exchange
for a credit on its planned golf course. The second involves a detention structure for the tributary
Soda Creek, to offset the contribution of another creek which the Denver Water Board wishes to
divert into Dillon. Telephone Interview with L. Wyatt, engineer, N.W. Colo. Council of Gov'ts
(Feb. 5, 1991). The Cherry Creek Reservoir program calls for a 50 percent reduction in phosphorus
loadings before nonpoint source reductions can be traded for point source ones; thus trading activity
is probably a couple of years away. Telephone Interview with J. Kempfer, Manager of the Cherry
Creek Basin Authority (Feb. 5, 1991). An amendment that would have included point/nonpoint
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paper will describe point/nonpoint source trading and what we know about
its potential for lowering control costs and bringing nonpoint sources
under control.
Point/nonpoint source trading is the bubble idea applied to watershed
management. A "bubble" (or "bowl" for a watershed) sums the emission
levels for all sources included in the bubble and allows adjustment of the
levels of control applied to each so long as the total does not exceed a
target aggregate emission level. 7 Specifically, point/nonpoint source trading has come to mean granting publicly-owned treatment plants and industrial point sources the option of bringing agricultural and urban nonpoint
sources under control rather than simply requiring further controls at the
point sources. The regulator continues to focus on the more easily identified and managed point source; but grants them more flexibility to pursue
lower cost control options.'
Soil conservation efforts aside, experimentation with incentive policies
such as point/nonpoint source trading has not been commonplace in water
quality regulation. Technology-based point source regulations arguably
were a logical first step in 1972.' Industrial and municipal point sources
were the worst and most obvious offenders of surface water quality. They
were also the easiest to address because their loadings emerge from a
discrete point such as the end of a pipe. Nonpoint source problems are
harder to manage because monitoring and enforcement become more
difficult when sources are diffuse. Markets for pollution reductions for
water quality have lagged behind those for air (since 1974) partly because
of the greater contribution of difficult to manage nonpoint sources.
Despite these institutional problems, we may now be at a stage where
nonpoint source reduction in many instances is less costly than further
point source controls. Thus the 1987 amendments to the Clean Water Act
call for state watershed management strategies to reduce nonpoint source
pollution. Section 319 (b)(4) of the 1987 amendments understandably
source trading as part of the 1990 reauthorization of the Coastal Zone Management Act was defeated
last year in Congress. Also, the Vermont Water Resources Board has advocated consideration of
point/nonpoint source trading for phosphorus management in the Lake Champlain basin. The technical
advisory for the Lake Champlain Management Conference that will develop a comprehensive pollution prevention, control, and restoration plan by 1993, is also considering point/nonpoint source
trading. Telephone Interview with F. Lowenstein, Director of the Lake Champlain Committee (Feb.
5, Dec. II, 1991).
7. Actually, point/nonpoint source trading as implemented more closely resembles "offsets,"
which allow a firm to create a new source in an area not currently meeting standards to it if the firm
can reduce emissions elsewhere in the area. The "bubble" concept is a general one and much better
known, however; the comparison with it is not a misleading one.
8. The fairness of achieving nonpoint source control at the expense of point sources is open to
question, however. The distributive implications of point/nonpoint source trading are largely unexplored.
9. See B. Ackerman & R. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1333, 1365
(1985).
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allows states to design management plans on a watershed-by-watershed
basis." Policies more flexible than national technology-based standards
may be necessary to manage nonpoint source problems, which are characteristically site-specific. In theory and perhaps in practice point/nonpoint source trading can help achieve nonpoint source control and lower
total control costs in the process.
The trading of pollution rights is not itself a novel idea, but its application to nonpoint source water pollution is. This paper is an interpretive
survey of the research into, and practical experience with, point/nonpoint
source trading. " In the next section a short discussion presents the case
for point/nonpoint source trading and offers a reminder that point/nonpoint
source trading, whatever its cost saving potential, will not avoid fundamental limitations of any approach for achieving nonpoint source control.
Point/nonpoint source trading will escape neither the cost savings/water
quality tradeoff nor the problems posed by limitations in our ability to
predict, monitor, and control nonpoint source loadings. It would, however, resolve some problems because it allows voluntary redistributions
of discharge rights and encourages site-specific management of water
quality problems. Even this brief discussion is able to raise the empirical
questions which underlie the broader question of how useful the point/
nonpoint source trading approach might be. A third section considers
these issues and others in more detail. The body of research and experience
suggests a capability for this policy alternative to lower control costs,
but we know less about important issues such as monitoring costs, market
power, distributive effects, incentives for innovation, and the types of
water quality problems for which the approach is feasible. The concluding
remarks suggest some directions for further research.
THE ECONOMICS OF POINT/NONPOINT TRADING:
THE RATIO "T"
A short discussion of the economics of point/nonpoint (PS/NPS) source
trading helps show both its appeal and some difficulties in its application.
10. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1987).
11. Several related reviews exist. K. Segerson, Incentive Policies for Control of Agricultural
Water Pollution, in Agriculture and Water Quality 39-62 (J. Braden & S. Lovejoy eds., 1990)
provides a more general survey of incentive policies that could be used for agricultural water pollution
control. K. Reichelderfer, National Agroenvironmental Incentives Programs: the U.S. Experience,
Id. at 1,31-46, surveys the United States experience with incentive policies for control of agricultural

water pollution control. Apogee Research for EPA, supra note 6, describes the design and performance of programs that use trading between point and nonpoint sources to control nutrients, and
presents the available evidence assessing the potential scope for their successful implementation
nationally. Bartfeld, supra note 5, focuses on design of PSINPS trading programs within the language
of the Clean Water Act. M. Griffin, W. K. Kreutzberger, and P. Binney, Research Needs for Nonpoint
Source Impacts, 3 Water Envir. and Tech. 60 (1991) identify knowledge gaps that make NPS pollution
control more costly and less reliable.
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The randomness of nonpoint source loadings makes them difficult to
predict. Our ability to monitor and control these loadings once they occur
is also less than perfect. More fundamental still is the tradeoff between
cost savings and water quality that no policy will avoid. In addition,
application of PS/NPS trading would likely be more difficult if the pollutant is one that decays. These issues are central to evaluating the potential of PS/NPS trading to bring NPSs under control.
PS/NPS trading has potential if cheap NPS reductions exist and are
similar enough in nature to the PS reductions they would replace. Thus
the usefulness of PS/NPS trading for bringing NPSs under control depends
on two related considerations. The first is a requirement that NPS control
should be a cheaper way of achieving water quality objectives than further
PS reductions. Sewage treatment plants, for example, are unlikely to
sponsor nonpoint source control measures (for example, conservation
tillage or sedimentation ponds) as a means of avoiding technology upgrades at their own sites unless doing so saves them money. Existing2
empirical studies suggest that this condition holds for at least some sites,
An early study of the Honey Creek watershed in Ohio finds potential
savings are small and depend on the level of reliability desired, the
capacity of the treatment plant alternative, and the level of phosphorus
removal. If the removal target is 25 percent and 50 percent reliability is
acceptable, then the estimated savings range from -0.3 to 8.84 1985
dollars per pound removed, depending upon capacity of the treatment
plant alternative. With higher reduction levels, higher desired reliability,
or treatment plant capacities greater than 10 million gallons per day,
removal at the treatment plant is cheaper than the conservation tillage
alternative. 3 Larger potential savings occur in the Industrial Economics
case study of the Wicomico basin in Maryland. Trading provides annual
savings of 64,000 1985 dollars (83 percent) in meeting a 25 percent
reduction level and $245,000 (35 percent) in meeting a 75 percent reduction target.' 4 Unfortunately no study of cost effectiveness exists that
would complement these case studies by providing insights on the national
level, where many environmental policy decisions are made.
The second consideration is that costly uncertainty stemming from the
prediction, monitoring, and control of NPS loadings should not overwhelm the possible savings. The regulator must find an acceptable balance
12. See, e.g., Report by DPRA Inc. for EPA, An Evaluation of the Cost Effectiveness of Agricultural Best Management Practices and Publicly Owned Treatment Works in Controlling Phosphorus Pollution in the Great Lakes Basin (1986) (unpublished report on file with EPA's Office of

Water, Washington, D.C.). See also Report by Industrial Economics for EPA, Point/Nonpoint Trading
to Reduce Phosphorus Loads to Chesapeake Bay: the Wicomico Case Study (1987) (unpublished

report on file with EPA's Office of Water, Washington, D.C.).
13. DPRA, supra note 12.
14. Industrial Economics, supra note 12.
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between the objectives of reducing control costs and achieving water
quality objectives with reliability. Not surprisingly, the potential of PS/
NPS trading depends on an evaluation of the familiar cost savings/water
quality tradeoff in an uncertain setting. Much of this potential boils down
to a social willingness to accept uncertainty in return for control cost
savings.
While the existence of savings is an easy enough idea, the cost savings/
water quality tradeoff is not. The issues the regulator must consider in
accepting NPS reductions for PS ones are several and complex. The cost
savings/water quality tradeoff is inherent in the regulator's most important
policy variable, the trading ratio "t." The regulator will accept a unit
reduction of the pollutant at a NPS only as a l/t units credit toward
avoided control at a PS. In other words, the trading ratio gives the number
of units of NPS loadings reduction a PS must sponsor to avoid reducing
its own loadings by a unit. The trading ratio is an adjustment to allow
for the differences in the nature of PS and NPS loadings and in the tasks
of regulating them. In the simplest sense the ratio can be thought of as
an adjustment reflecting the differences in marginal social costs posed by
the two types of sources. In particular, NPS loadings are less predictable
temporally and spatially because they are more random than PS loadings;
are less reliably controlled than PS controls; and in the case of phosphorus
produce a form that is less biologically available than that yielded by
wastewater effluent.' 5
The regulator selects the trading ratio so that the PS's decision whether
to engage in a trade will reflect the full social costs of each type of
reduction. Consider the value of one as a benchmark. 6 If the regulator
sets the trading ratio greater than one, then it is favoring PS reductions
and discouraging trading by making PSs create more than one unit of
NPS reduction in order to avoid its own unit reduction. As an extreme
example, one could consider the absence of PS/NPS trading to be a policy
setting the trading ratio prohibitively high. A policy setting the trading
15. A formal discussion of this ratio containing explicit consideration of many of these issues is
presented in D. Letson, S. Crutchfield & A. Malik, Point/Nonpoint Source Trading for Controlling
Pollutant Loadings to Coastal Watersheds: A Feasibility Study (forthcoming in The Management of
Nonpoint Source Pollution (C. Russell & J. Shogren eds.)). See also J. Shortle, Allocative Implications of Comparisons Between the Marginal Costs of Point and Nonpoint Source Pollution Abatement, 16 N.E.J. Agric. & Resource Econ. 17 (1987). The seminal economic model of regional

water quality management is W.D. Montgomery, Markets in Licenses and Efficient Pollution Control
Programs, 5 J. Econ. Theory 377 (1972).
16. The choice of one is for explicatory purposes. Values less than one are unlikely given Section
402(o) of the Clean Water Act, the antibacksliding provision, which discourages discharge permit
revisions that do not reduce total daily loadings of pollutants to a watershed. Bartfeld, supra 5. TarPamlico uses trading ratios of 3 and 2 for cropland, and animal waste loadings reductions, while
Dillon Reservoir uses a single trading ratio equal to 2.
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ratio greater than one may be well-advised if PS reductions are less costly
to achieve and enforce, if the performance of NPS controls are highly
uncertain, or if PS loadings are more damaging than those from NPSs.
Also, the value of the trading ratio should reflect any interdependence
between PS and NPS loadings. More sewer hookups, for example, usually
mean not only greater PS discharges at the sewage treatment plant but
also greater NPS loadings indirectly through the additional development
they allow. If more PS loadings imply more NPS loadings, then higher
values for the trading ratio are appropriate. 7 Conversely, a policy setting
the trading ratio less than one would favor NPS reductions and encourage
trading. A PS could avoid a unit reduction with less than a unit of NPS
reduction. Such a policy would be well-advised if NPS reductions are
less costly to achieve and enforce or if NPS loadings are more damaging
than those from PSs. "
How much trading will occur depends on considerations besides cost
that the regulator should consider in selecting its trading ratio. Tradeoffs
between point and nonpoint sources involve uncertainty. Trading and cost
savings are unlikely to occur if NPS control is so uncertain that it can
only minimally substitute for PS control. The reasons for this uncertainty
are many, but two stand out. Limitations in predicting storm-driven NPS
loadings imply difficulties in selecting the trading ratio that would appropriately substitute continuous PS loadings for them. Inadequate monitoring adds fuzziness by allowing dischargers to pollute without purchasing
the right to do so. In addition, federal and state policies may conflict
with the local incentive policy. USDA crop price and income support
programs, for example, inadvertently affect water quality and might present such an obstacle.
A trading ratio that would achieve both savings and reliable water
quality will not exist for many watersheds. To increase the chance that
water quality goals will be met despite the less-proven and more uncertain
performance of NPS controls, the regulator may choose to set a high
trading ratio. Such a policy would require larger NPS reductions to free
up PSs from their requirements. The case study of the Honey Creek basin
in Ohio explores many of these issues in comparing the cost effectiveness
of best management practices for agriculture versus phosphorus removal
by sewage treatment plants.' 9 In that study, reliability greater than a 50
percent chance of instantaneous compliance with the nutrient standard
17. This interdependence was one of the reasons why a ratio of 2 was selected for Dillon Reservoir
Apogee Research for EPA, supra note 6.
18. Letson, supra note 15.
19. See DPRA, supra note 12. See also J.W. Milon, Optimizing Nonpoint Source Controls in
Water Quality Regulation, 23 Water Resource Bull. 387 (1987).
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would come only at the expense of any cost savings. The ability of PS/
NPS trading to bring NPSs under control depends on the availability of
a value for the trading ratio that would satisfy both cost and reliability
objectives.
Not all limitations in practice for PS/NPS trading are inherent in the
regulator's choice of a single trading ratio. The potential of PS/NPS
trading to achieve NPS control also depends on the number of NPS
problems where it could be successfully applied. Point and nonpoint
sources do not always discharge the same pollutants. Point (bacteria and
oxygen-demanding waste) and nonpoint (sedimentation and nutrient enrichment) sources are often responsible to different degrees for different
types of water quality problems, so PS/NPS trading can probably at best
be only part of a solution for NPS related impairments. Also, extension
of PS/NPS trading beyond nutrient control is difficult because many pollutants are nonconservative (degradable). An acceptable answer to the
"t" question here would require us to consider the time dimension of
decay during transport. Regulation of nonconservative pollutants such as
biochemical oxygen demand requires the staggering of discharges by time
and location so that ambient constituent levels (of dissolved oxygen, for
example) do not violate standards. Formally, a different trading ratio
would exist for each pairing of two dischargers with a water quality
problem location; a trading ratio would reflect the relative impacts of the
sources' discharges upon, say, dissolved oxygen at the water quality
problem location. Not surprisingly the PS/NPS trading programs in place
involve conservative pollutants (for example, phosphorus) in waterbodies
that are not regularly flushed out. Water quality problems that include
nonconservative pollutants are more uncertain and more politically charged.
Trading programs are simpler and more appealing when the pollutant is
one that causes its trouble by accumulating. One last problem is that
ordinarily we cannot consider surface and ground water quality separately.
Ground water recharge and leaching will occur and may significantly vary
with trading activity. Offsetting these effects might prove difficult.
Some of these problems are fundamental to PS/NPS trading and thus
unavoidable. Selection of a conservative pollutant does not eliminate all
uncertainty, the sources of which are many. Our ability to monitor NPS
loadings is still limited since polluting actions are often unobservable and
we cannot infer them individually from ambient pollution levels. 2' Prediction of loadings is difficult because NPS pollution is largely stormdriven. We still have much to learn about physical systems and how well
pollution control systems work. A large physical modeling effort is nor20. K. Segcrson, Uncertainty and Incentives for Nonpoint Point Pollution Control, 15 J. Envtl.
Econ. Mgmt. 87 (1988).
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mally required to establish target loadings and boundaries for the watershed. The permits must be initially distributed in some way; methods
based on past discharge levels are more politically salable but require
information on historical practices that generally is not available for NPSs.
All these problems make PS/NPS trading less reliable than PS controls.
A value for the trading ratio that would achieve water quality objectives
and preserve some control cost savings may not exist. Designing a PS/
NPS trading policy that would lower actual costs and achieve NPS control
(formally, the choice of t) involves the familiar tradeoff between cost
savings and water quality in an uncertain setting. At issue is the existence
of a social willingness to accept uncertainty in return for control cost
savings. Even a brief verbal description of PS/NPS trading raises many
questions about its ability to achieve its potential savings.
RESEARCH ISSUES
While PS/NPS trading has its problems, it is worthy of further attention
for two reasons. First, problems exist for any approach that might achieve
NPS control on a large scale. Most of the problems described above will
afflict any attempt to control NPSs. Traditional pollution control policies
applied to NPSs would have some additional problems of their own.
Regulations would be difficult if not impossible to apply to site-specific
NPSs. Expanded use of voluntary methods such as cost sharing or technical assistance could carry a heavy federal price tag. Decentralized trading at least would handle the question of who would pay. This is no small
matter, as economic theory tells us that pollution problems are property
rights disputes. The 1987 amendments to the Clean Water Act call for
NPS control, but Congress has provided only a small amount of funding
($143.75 million), for the most part leaving states with the bill." Second,
the potential to save control costs does seem to exist.22 What remains to
be shown is that the potential control cost savings outweigh the uncertainty
of trading. Ironically, the evidence that would suggest this is usually or
ever the case would be successful PS/NPS trades, and few exist. Success
of PS/NPS trading will depend on its application to a broader range of
pollutants, improved policy design, and better enforcement. A listing of
associated research issues and needs follows.23
21. Fiscal Year 90 Congressional Appropriation was $40 million; $51 million in FY91 (EPA,
Managing Nonpoint Source Pollution: Final Report to Congress on Section 319 of the Clean Water
Act, EPA-506/9-90 at 8 (Apr. 1991)); and $52.75 million in FY92 (Telephone Interview with A.
Weinberg, EPA Office of Water, Nonpoint Source Control Branch (Feb. 21, 1992).
22. DPRA and Industrial Economics, supra note 12.
23. This listing follows the outline of T. Tietenberg, Emissions Trading: An Exercise in Reforming
Pollution Policy (1985).
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(1) Potential to save control costs. Case studies have provided examples where the potential of PS/NPS trading to reduce control costs
exists.2 4 In addition, the local regulatory authorities had established the
cost saving potential of the two trading programs in place in Colorado
before proceeding with implementation." More case studies would give
a better picture of the prospects of PS/NPS trading in different geographic
regions. That little trading has occurred at the three sites, however, despite
the possible savings, is somewhat disturbing and suggests that potential
control cost reduction alone may be a moot point.
(2) The spatial dimension. Successful extension of PS/NPS trading to
nonconservative pollutants would enhance its ability to bring NPSs under
control. As noted above, the PS/NPS trading programs in place regulate
conservative pollutants. Inorganic phosphorus does not decay, and its
total quantity determines its harmfulness. Nonconservative pollutants,
biochemical oxygen demand for example, present more of a problem.
The timing and location of their discharge are as important as their quantity. A trading program that limited only the total quantity of discharges
might well allow some areas to be in violation if the pollutant is nonconservative. One solution, unexplored in the existing literature, would
be to adjust the trading ratio to allow for decay rates. Another spatial
problem concerns the nutrient cycle in an estuary, where (a) multiple
nutrients may interact and (b) the limiting nutrient may vary by season. 26
These problems require a more extensive physical model and, with our
limitations therein, probably are feasible for small scale regulatory efforts
only.27

(3) Distributing the financial burden. The existing literature on PS/
NPS trading has not considered its distributive effects. Virtual unanimity
exists, among those who have studied the cost incidence of stationary
source air quality regulations, that command and control regulations (those
that specify the methods and technologies dischargers must use to control
pollutants) are regressive. 2 Higher product prices transmit the burden of
regulation disproportionately to the poor, who spend a higher percentage
of their incomes on affected commodities than do the rich. The same
might occur if the initial financial burden for agricultural NPS controls
24. DPRA & Industrial Economics, supra note 12.
25. R.W. Hahn & G.L. Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go?, 6 Yale J. Reg. 109 (1988).
26. A. Krupnick, Tradable Nutrient Permits and the Chesapeake Bay Compact (unpublished Future
Discussion Paper QE89-07, on file with Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C.) (1989).
27. J.A. Antle & S. Capalbo, Measurement and Evaluation of the Impacts of Agricultural Chemical Use: A Framework for Analysis (unpublished Resources Future Discussion Paper FAP90-09 on
file with Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C.) (1990).
28. See, e.g., L. Gianessi. H. Peskin & E. Wolff, The Distributional Effects of Uniform Air
Pollution Policy in the United States, 93 Q. J. Econ. 281 (1979). See also H. Robison, Who Pays
for Industrial Pollution Abatement?, 67 Rev. Econ. Stat. 702 (1985).

Sprng 1921

POINT/NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION

fell on farmers, since they would likely be able to pass some of these
costs on to consumers, depending upon price elasticities of supply and
demand for agricultural commodities. Policy makers might need to devise
transfers to offset any undesirable distributive effects.
Initial allocation of permits is another important distributive issue.
Much of the appeal of PS/NPS trading for policy makers is that it need
not redistribute discharge rights but allows voluntary trades that will.
Alternative methods of initial distribution might ease entry and exit for
the affected product markets, making them more competitive, but would
redistribute rights and would be coercive and costly for agricultural producers and urban areas.
Distributive analysis is also important because the distributive and
allocative effects of trading are not altogether separable. Another advantage of trading programs is what Tietenberg calls "cost sharing": the
party carrying out the reduction is not necessarily the one paying. 29 Conventional command and control policies are often slow to impose controls
because of a political reluctance to bankrupt businesses. Tradable permit
programs, then, can go into effect faster since they are less likely to put
firms out of business than nontradable permit programs. Also, command
and control policies can significantly influence industry structure. An
undesirable side effect of most air pollution controls, for example, is that
they affect only new sources and thus act as a barrier to the entry of new
firms, retarding capital turnover.30
(4) Market power. Two areas of concern exist. (a) Could a single
discharger or a group of them attain enough control over a permit market
to extract large transfers from other participants? (b) How would the
change to PS/NPS trading affect the degree of competitiveness in product
markets? We have more theoretical than empirical evidence on both questions. Malueg, for example, shows how introduction of permit trading
in regions where firms participate in noncompetitive output markets may
reduce social welfare. 3'
On the first question, it is easy to show that permit price manipulation
might produce some transfers, but because all parties would share in
them, significantly higher control costs are unlikely.32 As for the second
question, seldom do most of the participants in a product market coexist
in a single watershed. Tietenberg's example is the Piceance Basin in
Colorado, which produces most shale oil. As he notes, however, even
29. Tietenberg, supra note 23.
30. M.T. Maloney & G.L. Brady, Capital Turnover and Marketable Pollution Rights, 31 J. Law
Econ. 203 (1988).
31. D. Malueg, Welfare Consequences of Emissions Credit Trading Programs, 18 J. Envtl. Econ.
Mgmt. 66 (1990).
32. See, e.g., Tietenberg, supra note 23, at 127-28.
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these producers face competition from other types of energy.: Misiolek
and Elder offer the dissenting view, arguing that some firms might try to
manipulate the permit market to raise the costs of other firms and increase
their own monopoly power.'
(5) The temporal dimension. Here is another opportunity to broaden
the range of problems for application of PS/NPS trading. Permit design
can allow for temporally varying (for example, diurnal or seasonal) assimilative capacity. Periodic permits can manage predictable, short-term
peaks brought about by seasonal or diurnal variations in meteorological
conditions. Nonconservative pollutants whose rates of decay are temperature or flow dependent might be candidates for this approach. Episodic permits can manage pollution in the rare, but potentially devastating
instances that are predictable only a day or so in advance, such as thermal
inversions."
(6) Enforcement. NPS loadings are difficult to measure, and therefore
regulations for them are difficult to enforce. PS/NPS trading can do little
to alleviate this problem. Perhaps PS/NPS trading will become a more
attractive option as monitoring technology improves, but perhaps not. To
some extent we can observe and enforce behavior that reduces NPS
loadings. For example, USDA requires approved conservation practices
on highly erodible land. If we could establish stronger linkages between
activities and pollution, environmental policies would be more effective
and enforcement would be easier. Regulators could verify many control
options (reduced tillage, no till, and crop rotations, for example) by
observation.
The enforcement problem is complex and multi-dimensional; at least
three other areas deserve attention. (a) Cost minimizing behavior of firms
involves weighing the costs of compliance versus the costs of seeking
relaxed standards; the latter include the costs of lobbying, litigation,
negotiation, legal defenses, and penalties.36 Policies should minimize total
costs, not just control costs. (b) The focus of enforcement under command
and control regulations has been on initial compliance at the expense of
continuing compliance; the two are different sides of the same problem.
Malik shows how noncompliance can limit the efficiency of a permit
trading program. 7 (c) Limitations in monitoring pollution control efforts
33. Tietenberg, supra note 23, at 140-41.
34. W. Misiolek & H. Elder, Exclusionary Manipulation of Markets for Pollution Rights, 16 J.
Envtl. Econ. Mgmt 156 (1989).
35. J.W. Eheart, E.D. Brill, B. Lence, J. Kilgore & J. Uber, Cost Efficiency of Time-Varying
Discharge Permit Programs for Water Quality Management, 23 Water Resource Res. 245 (1987).
36. Ackerman, supra note 9.
37. A. Malik, Markets for Pollution Control When Firms Are Noncompliant, 18 J. Envtl. Econ.
Mgmt. 97 (1990).
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would reduce accuracy in verifying reductions, creating an incentive to
pollute.3" Cost efficiency and water quality might suffer as a result.
(7) Incentives for innovation. PS/NPS trading would provide long run
incentives for innovation since dischargers would have alternatives for
achieving mandated reductions. Because PS/NPS trading programs can
draw only from their watersheds for participants, the magnitude of this
incentive is less than for EPA emissions trading programs, for example,
some of which are more extensive geographically. Even if small, incentives for innovation can be important. The state of pollution control
technology is one set of boundaries for environmental policy design.
Kneese and Schultze have described the effects of regulation on the pace
of technological advance in pollution control as "perhaps the single most
important criterion on which to judge environmental policies." 39 Arguably, we should judge PS/NPS trading by its ability to achieve long run
rather than short run savings and NPS control.
Most of the literature in this area has focused on firm incentives to
develop firm-specific technologies. Recently, Milliman and Prince broadened the scope of these issues somewhat, describing three different phases
of technological change: innovation, diffusion, and optimal agency response. In their more general framework, cost effective control requires
promoting innovations with inter-firm applicability, encouraging the diffusion of new technologies, and recognition by the regulatory agency of
the lower costs implied by the new technology.' Benefits from such longterm planning might exceed those from short-term control cost reductions.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Given these institutional problems it is easy to be pessimistic about
the prospects for PS/NPS trading. On the other hand, no obvious alternative exists for achieving NPS control on a large scale. NPS water
pollution controls may be necessary if the objectives of federal water
pollution control legislation are to be met. If so, we will need policies
more flexible than national technology-based standards to manage NPS
problems, which are characteristically site-specific. This paper has provided an interpretive survey of the research into and the practical experience with PS/NPS trading. It has sought to assess the capability of PS/
NPS trading for achieving control cost savings and bringing NPSs under
control.
38. Hahn, supra note 25.
39. A. Kneese & C. Schultze, Pollution, Prices and Public Policy 82 (1978).
40. S. Milliman & R. Prince, Firm Incentives to Promote Technological Change in Pollution
Control, 17 J. Envtl. Econ. Mgmt. 246 (1989).
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PS/NPS trading is an idea whose time has not yet come for national
policy. Whether the potential to achieve cost savings and NPS control
will exist in the future is a question for further research. An applicability
to a broader range of pollutants and an ability to induce innovation might
make PS/NPS trading more attractive. We know something about the
capability of the policy to reduce control costs, but less about its administrative ease. Little is known about its ultimate distributive effects or the
influence of market power. Perhaps the most vexing complication is the
all too familiar difficulty of monitoring NPSs. If we cannot measure NPS
reductions, we will hardly be able to form a market for them. Unfortunately, monitoring problems, like many others discussed here, would
afflict almost any NPS control policy. Since we have no easy or cheaper
alternatives for achieving NPS control on a large scale, PS/NPS trading
remains worthy of our attention.
The scope of further research will also be important because policy
decisions will be made at all levels of government. Case studies can
capture the site-specific characteristics of each problem (for example,
climate, land and water uses, and geophysical characteristics of a watershed) and can lend themselves to regional inferences. Trading programs
should vary geographically because water quality problems do. Such
studies would contribute more if they could address the broader range of
issues outlined above rather than merely assessing control cost reduction
potential. The cost effectiveness of prevention (conservation tillage, for
example) as opposed to treatment (detention basins) is also worth examining. A national picture could emerge only from several more of these
studies, however. Alternatively, national assessment of the number of
opportunities for such a policy would lose such site-specific detail but
would bring the level of analysis to Where many policy decisions are
made. Shabman and Norris do this on a state level, offering a useful list
of "selection criteria" for determining the number of possible PS/NPS
trading sites in Virginia.4 Letson, Crutchfield, and Malik use a similar
approach to screen for coastal watersheds that could participate in a
hypothetical national program.42 Case studies and a national assessment
together would give a better assessment of the potential of PS/NPS trading
to reduce control costs and achieve NPS control.
Showing the control cost reduction potential of PS/NPS trading was
the easy part; the real case to be made for PS/NPS trading, through
research and documentation of existing programs, is that it can surmount
the problems discussed here and create the institutional structure for NPS
control.
4t. L. Shabman & P. Norris, Coordinating Point and Nonpoint Control of Nutrient Pollution:
Prospects for a Virginia Case Application (unpublished Virginia Tech Department of Agricultural
Economics Working Paper 39-87-1).
42. Letson, supra note 15. See also Apogee Research for EPA, supra note 6.

